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Abstract
The most influential work on the 
resource curse employs quantitative 
methodologies, typically some variant 
of  regression analysis that includes (to 
the extent that data allows) all of  the 
world’s countries over a number of  years. 
This paper argues that natural resource 
rents affect political outcomes through 
different channels, with varying impact 
and even direction of  effect. This 
complexity is very difficult to capture in 
a large quantitative model. This paper 
argues that careful case studies are a more 
suitable way to advance our knowledge of 
the resource curse.
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Introduction
The literature on the resource curse, like much of  comparative politics, puts a premium 
on finding generalisations that apply across many or most countries. The question that is 
usually asked goes something like this: what is the expected net effect of  rents on democracy 
(or economic growth, or civil war) across all countries in the world, or at least a large subset 
of  them? This usually presumes that a common set of  causal mechanisms drives outcomes 
across all cases. This is not in fact true. Instead the causal mechanisms by which rents 
affect outcomes are numerous and highly conditional. Given this ontology, an insistence on 
finding nomological, law-like regularities across the entire universe of  cases – when such 
regularities do not exist – will lead only to conflicting findings and policy recommendations 
that are either too vague to be useful or too obviously wrong to be taken seriously.
Methodology, Peter Hall writes, should be aligned with ontology.1 That is to say, the ontol-
ogy of  the subject we are studying – which he describes as our understanding of  ‘the 
character of  the world as it actually is’ – should drive our methodological choices when 
we study politics.2 The ontology of  the resource curse, I argue in this paper, is character-
ised by causal complexity, a result of  both pervasive conditionality and a multiplicity of 
causal mechanisms.3 This has implications for the appropriate methodologies for studying 
the impact of  oil revenues on political outcomes. The paper is divided into three parts. 
In the first I discuss views on causal complexity in the existing literature on the resource 
curse. Second, I assess the ontology of  the resource curse by considering the findings of 
existing studies. Third, I draw some conclusions on the best methodological approaches to 
use in the study of  the resource curse in the light of  evidence of  causal complexity. 
Earlier versions of  this paper were presented at the Middle East Studies Association annual conference 
in Denver, November 2015, at the London School of  Economics workshop on Varieties of  Rentierism? 
Comparing Resource Rich States in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa in October 2015, and at NYU Abu 
Dhabi for the workshop on Comparative Political Development in Post-Soviet Eurasia and the Middle East in 
December 2014.
1 Peter A. Hall, ‘Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics’, in James Mahoney 
and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003).
2   Ibid., p. 374. His fuller definition is ‘the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the nature of 
the social and political world and especially about the nature of  causal relationships within that world. 
If  a methodology consists of  techniques for making observations about causal relations, an ontology 
consists of  premises about the deep causal structures of  the world from which analysis begins and 
without which theories about the social world would not make sense.’
3   By ‘the resource curse’, I mean the political and economic outcomes of  the receipt of  rents. 
These outcomes are sometimes a blessing, sometimes a curse, and sometimes neither.
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Conditionality
Conditionality is perhaps best understood through an example drawn from the literature. 
Norway exports a great deal of  oil but appears to be entirely uncursed by it. To explain 
this, it is often argued that the causal mechanism that produces the resource curse does 
not operate in countries which had well-developed political institutions before exporting 
oil. Thus the effect of  rents on the outcome is conditional on the nature of  pre-oil insti-
tutions. A more formal definition is found in Brambor, Clark and Golder: a ‘conditional 
hypothesis is simply one in which a relationship between two or more variables depends 
on the value of  one or more other variables’.4 Thus in Norway, the impact of  rents on 
democracy depends on (specifically, is attenuated by) its high-quality pre-oil institutions. 
Simple conditionality can be dealt with in regression models in two ways. First, an inter-
action term can be added to the regression model.5 The variable measuring rentierism 
is multiplied by the conditioning variable. Thus, in the example above, if  institutional 
strength is coded from strong to weak (0 to 1), the interaction variable will have a value 
approaching zero in any country with strong institutions, regardless of  how much rent 
wealth it enjoys.6 Second, if  the causal mechanisms of  interest do not apply to a subset of 
cases, the most straightforward approach is simply to remove the cases from the dataset. 
Thus, in one of  several explorations of  the possibility of  conditionality, Haber and 
Menaldo theorise that the resource curse might operate only after 1973, and analyse a 
model that excludes earlier data.7 
4 Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder, ‘Understanding Interaction Models: 
Improving Empirical Analyses’, Political Analysis 14/1 (21 December 2006), pp. 63–82 at p. 64.
5   For a discussion in the resource curse literature itself, see Macartan Humphreys, ‘Natural Resources, 
Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms’, Journal of  Conflict Resolution 49/4 
(1 August 2005), pp. 508–37 at p. 521. See more generally Brambor et al., ‘Understanding Interaction 
Models’; Cindy D. Kam and Robert J. Franzese, Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression 
Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 2007); Robert J. Friedrich, ‘In Defense of  Multipli-
cative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations’, American Journal of  Political Science 26/4 (1 November 
1982), pp. 797–833; Bear F. Braumoeller, ‘Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms’, 
International Organization 58/4 (1 October 2004), pp. 807–20.
6   This differs from the procedure followed when a variable has an independent impact on the outcome 
variable: in that case, the second variable is included as a separate ‘control’ variable in the regression 
model.
7   Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, ‘Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal 
of  the Resource Curse’, American Political Science Review 105/1 (February 2011), pp. 1–26 at p. 19.
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Conditionality in the Literature on the Resource Curse
Waldner and Smith identify three schools of  thought on conditionality among those who 
study the resource curse: the orthodox, the heterodox and the dissenting.8 The orthodox 
school holds that rents have an unconditioned effect on political outcomes. The heterodox 
view holds that rents have a mediated (or conditional) effect on outcomes. The dissenting 
view ‘denies any systematic relationship between resource abundance and political-eco-
nomic outcomes’.9 Along similar lines, Liou and Musgrave, in a 2014 article, identify 
two schools: the ‘resource pessimists’, who are the ‘orthodox’ of  Waldner and Smith, 
and the ‘resource conditionalists’, who argue that ‘the curse is contingent on factors like 
institutional quality – or that there is no curse at all’.10 In both articles the dissenting or 
conditionalist view is identified, at least to some degree, with those who find evidence of 
no impact, or a positive impact, of  rents on outcomes.11 It is true that those who find more 
conditionality in the resource curse also frequently dispute the degree to which rents are 
a curse, but nonetheless the two issues are different. One is about the direction of  the net 
effect, the other is about the level of  conditionality. In the discussion below I focus only on 
the level of  causal complexity, not on the direction of  effect.
Few scholars – perhaps no scholars – offer an unambiguous defence of  the orthodox posi-
tion (understood here as an advocacy of  no conditionality). To be sure, some prominent 
studies take little or no account of  conditionality. This is true of  the three foundational 
works of  the resource curse literature, each of  which uses quantitative methods to examine 
the impact of  rents on a different dependent variable. The first of  these pieces was Sachs 
and Warner’s 1995 paper on the effect of  resource dependence on economic growth.12 
This was followed by Michael Ross’s 2001 article on oil and democracy.13 The third was 
Collier and Hoeffler’s 2004 paper on natural resources and civil war.14 Each of  these 
8   David Waldner and Benjamin Smith, ‘Rentier States and State Transformations’, in Stephan Leibfried 
et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of  Transformations of  the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 714.
9   Ibid. Sean Yom calls this the ‘revisionist’ school of  resource curse studies. Sean L. Yom, ‘Oil, Coali-
tions, and Regime Durability: The Origins and Persistence of  Popular Rentierism in Kuwait’, Studies in 
Comparative International Development 46/2 (May 2011), pp. 217–41. Ahmadov, in a review of  29 large-n 
studies on rents and democracy, calls this ‘a nascent movement toward conditional theories of  the 
resource curse’. Anar K. Ahmadov, ‘Oil, Democracy, and Context A Meta-Analysis’, Comparative Political 
Studies 47/9 (1 August 2014), pp. 1238–67 at p. 1240.
10   Yu-Ming Liou and Paul Musgrave, ‘Refining the Oil Curse: Country-Level Evidence from Exog-
enous Variations in Resource Income’, Comparative Political Studies 47/11 (1 September 2014), pp. 
1584–1610 at p. 1585.
11   Thus Liou and Musgrave call the orthodox school the ‘pessimists’, while Waldner and Smith 
(‘Rentier States and State Transformations’, p. 716) identify Brunnschweiler’s study as falling into the 
dissenting school, even though she finds a ‘positive effect on growth’. See Christa N. Brunnschwei-
ler, ‘Cursing the Blessings? Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions, and Economic Growth’, World 
Development 36/3 (March 2008), pp. 399–419.
12   Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, ‘Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth’, 
NBER Working Paper Series 5398 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of  Economic Research, 1995).
13   Michael L. Ross, ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’, World Politics 53 (April 2001), pp. 325–61.
14   Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56/4 
(2004), pp. 563–95.
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studies helped to launch a debate about its respective dependent variable, and they appear 
to be the most highly cited works in the literature on the resource curse (each has more than 
2,000 cites in Google Scholar).15 The lack of  conditionality in their models,16 however, is 
not the same as a spirited defence of  orthodoxy. These were the first prominent works to 
apply quantitative methods to the relationship between rents and their respective depen-
dent variables, and each provided evidence of  a correlation in the direction of  a curse. 
The absence of  conditionality should not be read as evidence that these authors refused 
conditionality in principle, as the later work of  some of  these authors shows. In a subse-
quent piece published in 2005 Collier and Hoeffler wrote that ‘Large resource rents are 
not intrinsically a curse […] [T]he search for conditioning circumstances is a key research 
agenda.’17 Ross’s 2014 co-authored response to Haber and Menaldo hinges on temporal 
conditionality and favourably cites other examples of  conditional arguments in the litera-
ture.18 In short, while one can still find the occasional study that includes no conditionality, 
there is little debate about the possibility of  conditionality in the resource curse: the battle, 
if  it was ever really joined, is over. No one seems to be defending the orthodox position. 
Simple vs. Complex Conditionality
Despite the absence of  diehard defenders of  the orthodox position, we can discern the 
lineaments of  a different debate: one between those who find some, but limited, con-
ditionality in the resource curse, and those who find a great deal of  conditionality. 
The stakes of  this debate are in fact greater than those of  the debate between the orthodox 
position and those who argue for simple conditionality: it is not difficult to accommodate 
simple conditionality within the original research agendas set out by the three founda-
tional pieces discussed above – an interaction term does it. Complex conditionality is 
harder: it is not amenable to standard quantitative analysis, especially in the context of  the 
resource curse, where the unit of  analysis is usually the country, and thus cases are limited 
in number.19 Interaction terms multiply, the number of  cases shrinks, and the already for-
midable obstacles to the use of  large-n methods to study nation-states become even more 
daunting. Given the paucity of  cases for any particular causal mechanism, complex condi-
tionality makes it difficult to make law-like statements about the effect of  rents on politics. 
15   Google Scholar, as of  September 2015, showed over 5,000, 3,800 and 2,300 citations for the pieces 
by, respectively, Collier and Hoeffler, Sachs and Warner, and Ross. While I did not do an exhaustive 
check, I could find no other pieces on the resource curse with citation counts this high.
16   Collier and Hoeffler do use an interaction term to change the independent variable from primary 
commodities to only oil. Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, p. 580.
17   Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict’, Journal of  Conflict Reso-
lution 49/4 (1 August 2005), pp. 625–33 at p. 627.
18   Jørgen J. Andersen and Michael L. Ross, ‘The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo 
Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies 477 (1 June 2014), pp. 993–1021 at p. 1015.
19   Democracy is hard to measure except at the level of  the sovereign state, and much the same is true 
of  economic growth and civil war.
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Simple Conditionality
Simple conditionality is ubiquitous in the literature, appearing virtually from the begin-
ning of  the discussion of  the rentier state. Often only one condition is entertained and 
the presumption of  generality remains strong. The overall effect of  this sort of  condi-
tionality is to explain some obvious outliers, leaving highly generalisable theories that 
applied to cases across a wide variety of  contexts. Thus, for example, in a widely read 
1997 book, The Paradox of  Plenty, Terry Lynn Karl asserts that her argument applies to all 
capital-deficient oil exporters, a diverse group of  countries that includes Algeria, Indo-
nesia, Iran, Nigeria and Venezuela.20 She writes that ‘countries dependent on the same 
export activity are likely to display significant similarities in the capacity (or incapacity) 
of  their respective states to guide development, even if  their actual institutions are quite 
different in virtually all other respects’.21 Mehlum, Moene and Torvik in 2006 published 
a prominent reassessment of  Sachs and Warner in which they included an interaction 
term for institutional quality: they found a negative effect of  oil dependence on economic 
growth that was limited to cases with weaker institutions.22 The degree of  conditionality 
is limited and accommodated within the framework of  an econometric model. Michael 
Ross, in the response to Haber and Menaldo mentioned above (co-authored with Jørgen 
Andersen), argues that the causal mechanism through which oil rents damage democ-
racy did not operate until the late 1970s, when countries gained control of  their own oil 
resources.23 These authors conclude with an endorsement of  conditionality, or at least 
of  temporal conditionality, writing that ‘most meaningful claims in political science are 
probably specific to a set of  historical conditions that change over time’.24 These are only 
a few examples of  a widespread tendency in the literature to find simple conditionality in 
the resource curse. If  there is an orthodoxy in the resource curse literature, it is an ortho-
doxy that admits to conditionality, but insists on the possibility of  wide generalisability of 
findings once conditionality has been addressed. 
20   Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of  Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley, CA: University of  California 
Press, 1997), pp. 17–19.
21   Ibid., p. 237.
22   Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik, ‘Institutions and the Resource Curse’, Economic 
Journal 116/508 (January 2006), pp. 1–20 at p. 13. For a formal model of  this, see James A. Robinson, 
Ragnar Torvik and Thierry Verdier, ‘Political Foundations of  the Resource Curse’, Journal of  Development 
Economics 79/2 (April 2006), pp. 447–68.
23   Andersen and Ross, ‘Big Oil Change’, p. 1001.
24   Ibid., p. 1016.
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Complex Conditionality
It is possible to find, however, suggestions in the literature of  a much deeper and more 
complex conditionality. Eric Davis, as far back as 1991, makes an argument for what 
amounts to complex conditionality in response to claims that oil makes rentier states 
autonomous: 
Each Arab oil-producing state possesses a different historical tradition and trajec-
tory and has had to respond to a different set of  sociohistorical forces. The notion 
of  ‘relative autonomy’ collapses the historical specificity of  Arab oil states into a 
static conceptual framework that fails to indicate the genesis of  particular types 
of  state formation.25 
Gwenn Okruhlik’s 1999 article on the Saudi opposition concludes with the assertion that 
‘historical and social contexts must be integrated into analyses of  contemporary rentier 
states […] The receipt of  oil revenues per se does not explain development or opposition or 
relations between ruler and ruled. The manner in which the rent is deployed, however, tells 
us much.’26 Steffen Hertog, in his 2010 World Politics piece on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
writes that, ‘Gulf  SOEs show that rent inflows do not automatically lead to institutional 
stagnation or decay as resource curse theorists have posited. Rather, political circumstances 
determine which institutions are built with oil money.’ His argument embraces contingency: 
‘SOE politics are complex and contingent. The stylised facts presented in this article do not 
allow for firm predictions of  what a specific rentier SOE is going to look like. Elite agency 
and historical context cannot be modeled in the abstract.’27 
We also find support for complex causality in works in the large-n tradition. 
Benjamin Smith concludes his 2004 American Journal of  Political Science article writing that:
The wide variation in levels of  stability in oil dependent states suggests that oil 
wealth might exert varying effects on regime durability and domestic conflict. 
Large-n statistical analysis is unlikely to provide an answer to this question […] 
[S]tatistical and small-n or case study methodologists have underplayed the im-
portance of  agency and timing […] none have provided a theory to explain how 
oil revenues might ‘do’ different things depending on the context in which they 
do them.28 
25   Eric Davis, ‘Theorizing Statecraft and Social Change in Arab Oil-Producing Countries’, in Eric 
Davis and Nicola Gavrielides (eds), Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Historical Memory and Popular Culture 
(Gainesville, FL: University Press of  Florida, 1991), pp. 11–12.
26   Gwenn Okruhlik, ‘Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of  Opposition: The Political Economy 
of  Rentier States’, Comparative Politics 31 (April 1999), pp. 295–315 at p. 309. See also Jonathan Di John, 
‘Oil Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A Critical Assessment’, Journal of  Development Studies 43/6 
(2007), pp. 961–86 at p. 980.
27   Steffen Hertog, ‘Defying the Resource Curse: Explaining Successful State-Owned Enterprises in 
Rentier States’, World Politics 62/2 (April 2010), pp. 261–301 at p. 293.
28   Benjamin B. Smith, ‘Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999’, 
American Journal of  Political Science 482 (April 2004), pp. 232–46 at p. 243.
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Haber and Menaldo, in their American Political Science Review piece, are agnostic about the 
underlying causal mechanisms of  the theory, freely admitting that there might be cases in 
which rents encouraged authoritarianism – or, for that matter, democracy. But, they write, 
‘there is a big difference between pointing to these instance and making sweeping, law-
like statements’.29 Liou and Musgrave, in an excellent 2014 article in Comparative Political 
Studies, also make a sustained argument for complex conditionality, posing their conclu-
sions in direct comparison with a more simple conditionality. They study seven countries 
that became rentiers as a result of  the 1973 oil-price shock, using synthetic controls to 
construct counterfactuals.30 Liou and Musgrave find that ‘the pessimists’ [i.e. the ‘ortho-
dox’ of  Waldner and Smith] mechanism is operative in Algeria. However, the experiences 
of  Ecuador and Nigeria lead us to suspect that the link between oil and democratisation is 
less straightforward than either pessimists or conditionalists expect.’31 They conclude that 
‘similarly situated countries did not react similarly to the oil shock’.32 
This survey of  the resource curse is hardly comprehensive. It does serve, however, to illus-
trate the main point: scholars working on the resource curse frequently find conditionality, 
and suggest that this conditionality is pervasive, extensive, hard to deal with in regression 
models, and a characteristic of  the ontology of  rents and politics. 
Other Sources of Causal Complexity
Conditionality is not the only potential source of  causal complexity in the study of  the 
resource curse. Macartan Humphreys has written that the literature on the resource curse 
– specifically, the resource curse and civil war – suffers from an ‘embarrassment of  mech-
anisms’, and questions whether or not econometric large-n methods are adequate to the 
task for this reason.33 While he answers the question in favour of  econometric methods, 
he also provides a particularly vivid account of  the profusion of  causal mechanisms in 
the explanation of  civil war via rents. The problem is hardly limited to the issue of  civil 
war: there is a similar embarrassment of  mechanisms connecting rents with democracy. 
The causal mechanisms through which rents have been said to harm democracy include: 
state autonomy,34 greater state repressive capacity,35 the relative absence of  taxation,36 the 
29   Haber and Menaldo, ‘Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?’, p. 25.
30   Liou and Musgrave, ‘Refining the Oil Curse’, pp. 1586, 1594. On synthetic controls, see Alberto 
Abadie, Alexis Diamond and Jens Hainmueller, ‘Comparative Politics and the Synthetic Control 
Method’, American Journal of  Political Science 59/2 (1 February 2015), pp. 495–510.
31   Liou and Musgrave, ‘Refining the Oil Curse’, p. 1602.
32   Ibid., p. 1604.
33   Humphreys, ‘Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution’, p. 510. For a survey of  some 
causal mechanisms through which rents might discourage economic development see Frederick Van der 
Ploeg, ‘Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?’, Journal of  Economic Literature 49/2 (June 2011), pp. 366–420.
34   Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
35   Ross, ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’, pp. 335–6.
36   Giacomo Luciani, ‘Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework’, in Giacomo Luciani 
(ed.), The Arab State (Berkeley, CA: University of  California Press, 1990), pp. 65–84.
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dependence of  the bourgeoisie,37 the absence of  the sort of  class politics found in capi-
talist societies,38 citizen contentment with their rulers,39 rent-induced political stability,40 a 
rentier mentality,41 a rentier social contract, and many others. A number of  causal mech-
anisms that make democratisation more likely are also found in the literature: rents make 
democracy more likely by increasing levels of  education, creating a large middle-class,42 
promoting a transition away from a class structure dominated by an agricultural land-
lord elite,43 easing the distributional threat of  democratisation,44 and more. Ultimately, of 
course, what matters is not how many causal mechanisms are found in the literature, but 
how many causal mechanisms are found in the political world. The abundance of  causal 
mechanisms in the literature, however, gives us some reason to think that the ontology of 
the resource curse might in fact be characterised by multiple causal mechanisms.
Exploring the Ontology of the Resource Curse
What sort of  evidence would help us to determine the actual level of  causal complexity 
in the resource curse, in terms of  both conditionality and the number of  operating causal 
mechanisms? We do not, of  course, have a definitive answer to this question. If  we did, 
we would also know the specific causal mechanisms at work, and we could move on to 
some other problem. Nonetheless, scholars have spent a good deal of  time examining the 
resource curse, and we can draw some conclusions from the results of  their efforts.
In the large-n literature on the resource curse we find pretty much what we would expect 
to find if  the ontology of  the resource curse featured more rather than less causal com-
plexity: we find uncertain and disputed evidence of  a net effect of  rents on outcomes, and 
little agreement on causal mechanisms.45 While it is probably fair to say that the large-n 
37   Eva Bellin, ‘Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing 
Countries’, World Politics 52/2 (January 2000), pp. 175–205 at p. 196.
38   Jacques Delacroix, ‘The Distributive State in the World System’, Studies in Comparative International 
Development 15/3 (Fall 1980), pp. 3–21.
39   In poorer rentiers, this contentment lasts only while revenues are rising. In the richest rentiers, the 
effect might plausibly last several generations.
40   Smith, ‘Oil Wealth and Regime Survival’. Smith argues that rents make regimes more durable. Since 
most oil exporters started out authoritarian (as a result of  factors exogenous to their oil), regime dura-
bility plausibly acts as an explanation for continued authoritarianism.
41   Luciani, ‘Allocation vs. Production States’.
42   John Clark, ‘Petro-Politics in Congo’, Journal of  Democracy 8/3 (July 1997), pp. 62–76 at p. 74; John R. 
Heilbrunn, Oil, Democracy, and Development in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 8.
43   Terry Lynn Karl, ‘Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela’, in 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Latin America. Vol. 2 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
44   Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008).
45   The literature on rents and economic growth seems to have settled on a specific mechanism related 
to the quality of  institutions, but there is much dissent about the actual impact of  institutions, and some 
articles find other mechanisms, such as education. Thorvaldur Gylfason, ‘Natural Resources, Educa-
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scholarly literature on the resource curse leans towards the view that resources do in fact 
impart a curse,46 it is also true that many scholars using large-n methods contest this finding, 
and there is a spirited debate in the literature over the existence of  even a net negative 
impact of  oil on economic growth or democracy.47 What we do not find is an unambiguous 
net effect of  rents on outcomes, in one direction, along with a clear indication of  the specific 
causal mechanism at work. That said, it is asking a lot of  the method to expect unambigu-
ous results from large-n regression studies. The data are observational, drawn from a small 
and fixed universe of  cases, not independent of  each other, and not otherwise particularly 
amenable to regression analysis. Even if  the ontology of  the resource curse were charac-
terised by simple causality, large-n methods might not yield clear results. The lack of  clear 
results from the literature, however, suggests either that there is causal complexity in the 
ontology of  the resource curse or that the data are intractable to large-n methods. Or, 
perhaps, both. 
Case Studies
Careful case studies, and especially comparative case studies, frequently identify important 
causal mechanisms in which oil affects outcomes through paths that are highly depen-
dent on the existing political context – that is to say, in ways that are highly conditional. 
This occurs even in works that otherwise argue for the generalisability of  rentier causal 
mechanisms. Jill Crystal, to give one example, argues for the oil-induced autonomy of  the 
rentier state, but her case studies of  Kuwait and Qatar show the divergent political roles 
played by the merchant class in each country.48 
What we do not find in the case study literature is the repeated identification of  a similar 
set of  causal mechanisms operating across cases drawn from the Middle East, Central Asia, 
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, with a relatively small number of  conditional-
ities. Instead we find a profusion of  causal mechanisms beset by chronic conditionality. 
Perhaps this is because scholars undertaking case studies are missing the forest for the trees. 
But this is unlikely: political science puts a premium on finding forests, so the greater risk is 
that scholars will find a tree and call it a forest. In the discussion below I do not attempt to 
tion, and Economic Development’, European Economic Review, 15th Annual Congress of  the European 
Economic Association, 45/4–6 (May 2001), pp. 847–59.
46   This is, for example, Gerring’s reading of  the literature on rents and democracy. I think, however, 
that he overstates the consensus around the existence of  a curse. John Gerring, ‘Causal Mechanisms: 
Yes, But … ’, Comparative Political Studies 43/11 (1 November 2010), pp. 1499–1526 at p. 1507.
47   Those who question the negative findings of  the resource curse on economic growth include Christa 
N. Brunnschweiler and Erwin H. Bulte, ‘The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of  Par-
adoxes and Red Herrings’, Journal of  Environmental Economics and Management 55/3 (May 2008), pp. 
248–64; Brunnschweiler, ‘Cursing the Blessings?’. On rents and democracy, the most prominent dis-
senting statement is Haber and Menaldo, ‘Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?’. See also Liou 
and Musgrave, ‘Refining the Oil Curse’; Michael Herb, ‘No Representation without Taxation? Rents, 
Development and Democracy’, Comparative Politics 37/3 (April 2005), pp. 297–316.
48   Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 2. She identifies a ‘patterned, recurring response to oil’, but writes that ‘the 
processes induced by oil, although similar in each state, are not identical’.
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review the entire case study literature, which is quite large. Instead, I focus on three exam-
ples. I first examine an excellent 2004 article on civil wars by Michael Ross. I then consider 
the causal mechanisms at work in the Gulf  monarchies, drawn from my own previous work. 
Finally I examine the rich literature on the resource curse in South America. 
Civil War
In his influential and widely cited 2004 International Organization article on civil wars, 
Michael Ross uses case study techniques to ‘explore the mechanisms behind’ the cor-
relation between natural resources and civil war.49 ‘Identifying the mechanisms that link 
resources to civil war’, he writes, ‘would make these theories more complete and persua-
sive: statistical correlations can only take one so far.’50 
Ross considers, in total, 13 causal mechanisms. He starts with nine, drawn from the exist-
ing literature, and drops two immediately for their intractability to the case study method. 
He adds an additional four that emerge in the course of  the case studies and which had 
not been noticed in the literature to that point. There are three dependent variables in the 
study: the onset of  civil wars, their duration and their intensity.51 The case studies include 
all the instances of  civil war in the 1990s in which it had been suggested, in the literature, 
that natural resources had a causal role – there are 13 such cases. The goal thus is not to 
provide evidence on the likelihood that rents will affect outcomes, but to show how rents 
affected outcomes where evidence of  this effect already exists.52 
Ross does not find any support for several causal mechanisms that figure prominently in 
the large-n literature, reinforcing the utility – or necessity – of  a close understanding of 
the cases. A summary of  Ross’s conclusions – organised below by outcome variable – gives 
a vivid sense of  the degree of  causal complexity in the effect of  rents on civil wars.
Civil War Onset: Natural resources contributed to the onset of  civil wars in five of  the 
13 cases, via three separate mechanisms. 
• Natural resources helped trigger two of  the separatist conflicts (Indonesia and Sudan) 
but not the third (Burma).
• Foreign powers supported ‘nascent’ rebel movements in the hope of  securing access to 
natural resources as those movements captured territory. This occurred in two cases: 
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of  Congo.
• Rebel groups sold mineral rights to international firms or foreign governments, 
then used the funds to seize control of  the resources. Ross calls these ‘booty futures’. 
This happened in the Congo Republic and in Sierra Leone (in the latter country two 
causal mechanisms were at work).
49   Michael L. Ross, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases’, 
International Organization 58/1 (Winter 2004), pp. 35–67 at p. 35.
50   Ibid., p. 36.
51   Ibid., pp. 37–9.
52   Ibid., pp. 46, 48.
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The second and third causal mechanisms were not found in the previous literature and 
emerged out of  the case studies. 
Civil War Duration: Natural resource rents had an impact on the duration of  civil wars 
through five mechanisms (two pairs of  mechanisms operated similarly, with the direction 
of  their effect on outcomes dependent on a conditioning variable).
• In ten of  the 13 cases, rents from natural resources helped rebel movements stay in the 
field, lengthening conflicts. This is the most generalisable, and least complex, mecha-
nism of  the entire study.
• In two cases, the prospect of  looting resources in the future gave actors an incentive 
to lengthen the conflict.
• But in three cases the prospect of  looting resources in the future gave actors an incen-
tive to settle the conflict. This is, of  course, nearly identical to the mechanism above. 
The additional conditionality at work here appears to lie in the ability of  combatants 
to work out a durable deal in which rebels stop fighting in return for control over 
natural resource rents.
• The sale of  booty futures lengthened two conflicts already under way.
• But the sale of  booty futures shortened one conflict. The conditionality at work here is 
as follows: if  the stronger side sells the futures, the war ends sooner. If  it is the weaker 
side, the sale of  futures extends the war.
Civil War Intensity: Ross identifies three mechanisms through which natural resource 
rents made conflicts more intense.
• In two cases, both of  them separatist civil wars, governments pre-emptively repressed 
opposition because the government feared that a separatist movement would take 
control of  natural resources.
• In nine of  the 13 cases, battles occurred over control of  resources which, if  the re-
sources had not been present, probably would not have occurred. This heightened the 
intensity of  the conflicts.
• But in eight cases (all among the nine cases above) wars paused while combatants 
exploited natural resources. In the absence of  the natural resources, a pause would 
not have been expected. Ross does not identify the conditions under which a pause, 
or more war, is to be expected, and concludes that the two mechanisms wash each 
other out.
Overall, this is powerful evidence of  causal complexity. It is true that there is one causal 
mechanism that operates in a single direction across a number of  cases (i.e., rebel move-
ments that gain income from natural resources stay on the field longer). But there are three 
pairs of  closely related causal mechanisms that, depending on very specific conditional-
ities, had the opposite effect on outcomes. Four additional causal mechanisms applied 
only to a small subset of  cases (among a set of  cases selected in a way to maximise the 
possibility of  detecting causal mechanisms). Ross does not shy away from this in his con-
clusions. He writes that ‘This multiplicity of  causal linkages – and the absence of  a singly, 
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ubiquitous mechanism – may help account for the analytic muddle, and contradictory 
findings, of  earlier studies.’53 Nonetheless, he proposes that the next step ought to be more 
and better large-n studies.
Gulf Rentiers
My second set of  examples is drawn from my work on the Gulf  monarchies, in which I 
find that the most important paths by which rents affect political and economic outcomes 
are not ones that have been much noticed in the larger literature on the resource curse. 
To understand these rentiers, and their place in the resource curse literature, it is necessary to 
start with a short discussion of  how we measure rentierism. Earlier literature on the resource 
curse employed what we might call fractional measures of  rentierism: in Sachs and Warner, 
the variable measuring rentierism was primary exports as a share of  GDP, which also appears 
in Collier and Hoeffler.54 This measure and others like it are deeply flawed, mostly because 
they measure poverty as much as they measure rents.55 Many scholars have instead turned to 
per capita measures of  rentierism so as to disentangle rentierism from poverty.56 Countries 
with high values on per capita (rather than fractional) measures are countries which receive a 
great deal of  per capita rent income from natural resources. The countries at the top of  these 
measures vary according to the type of  rent and the year, but Qatar and Kuwait are typically 
at the top, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Brunei and Norway not far behind. When 
per capita revenues per citizen (rather than resident) are used as the measure, the three Gulf 
states are clearly the world’s richest rentiers.57 They are followed by Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Trinidad, Libya and Equatorial Guinea. Natural resource exporters at the lower end of  the 
measure include Angola, Australia, Canada, Nigeria and many others. 
We have good reasons to pay attention to variations in the degree of  rent wealth per 
capita. The causal effects of  oil wealth on political outcomes in a country with $300 
per capita in rent wealth are likely to be very different from the effect on outcomes in a 
country with $30,000 per capita in rent wealth. Oil rents might loom large in the politi-
cal economy of  both countries (and certainly in the richer one), but the causal nature of 
those impacts is likely to be quite different in the two cases. It is not just that the impact of 
53   Ibid., p. 62.
54   Sachs and Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, p. 8; Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed 
and Grievance in Civil War’, p. 565. Ross uses a very similar measure in his 2001 piece: Ross, ‘Does Oil 
Hinder Democracy?’, p. 338.
55   These measures all have a numerator and a denominator. The poorer the country, the smaller the 
denominator and thus, holding the volume of  rents equal, the higher the value of  ‘rentierism’. Thus oil 
exports as a share of  total exports are higher when countries export very little apart from oil, rents are a 
higher percentage of  all government revenues when there is nothing much else for governments to tax, 
and so forth.
56   For a full discussion, see Michael Herb, The Wages of  Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait 
and the UAE (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 9–17. See also Michael L. Ross, ‘Oil, 
Islam, and Women’, American Political Science Review 102/1 (February 2008), pp. 107–23 at p. 121.
57   Herb, The Wages of  Oil, pp. 9–17.
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rents increases with the sum of  per capita rent income, but that the nature of  the causal 
mechanism differs. This contributes to the causal complexity of  the resource curse, and 
underlines the importance of  understanding the specific ways that rents impact outcomes 
in particularly wealthy rentiers.
In really rich rentiers, one of  the most profound impacts of  rentierism is on labour markets 
and demography. Oil wealth has a clear causal role in creating the demographic imbal-
ance – as it is called in the region – between citizens and foreigners. The causal pathway 
works something like this:58 
• The three richest Gulf  oil exporters enjoy such an abundance of  oil wealth that they 
can hire into public sector positions, as a matter of  course, the majority of  citizen 
graduates of  secondary schools and colleges, and pay a wage that provides a first-
world standard of  living.
• The private sector, seeking cheaper labour, imports foreign labour from abroad.
• Foreigners are rarely naturalised, because, in countries in which citizen benefits are 
paid for through oil revenues rather than taxes, each new citizen increases the number 
of  people amongst whom a limited sum of  oil wealth must be divided.
The result is a labour force rigidly divided between citizens and non-citizens, and spectacular 
demographic imbalances in which non-citizens in the UAE make up 88 per cent of  the total 
population of  the country (Qatar is similar, Kuwait has proportionally fewer foreigners). 
This phenomenon is central to the political economy of  the Gulf  states. But it is hardly 
mentioned at all in the larger literature on the resource curse.59 This is probably because 
the demographic imbalance is thought to be an idiosyncrasy of  the Gulf. Yet there is 
nothing idiosyncratic about a phenomenon that occurs in most of  the countries at the top 
of  the measure of  rentierism. It is, instead, a characteristic, though not inevitable, con-
sequence of  extreme rent wealth, one crucial to understanding how rents affect political 
and economic outcomes. 
Even among the richer rentiers, however, high rent wealth does not invariably cause 
labour market distortions. Some rich rentiers – a bit less rich than the Gulf  monarchies – 
do not suffer from a demographic imbalance and its associated labour market distortions, 
and these rentiers include both Norway and Trinidad. (In Norway the public sector, mea-
sured as a percentage of  employees, is smaller than it is in Denmark.)60 There is no doubt 
that rents are causally implicated in labour market distortions in the Gulf  monarchies, but 
the causal mechanisms that produce these distortions do not operate in all rich rentiers.
58   Ibid., ch. 1.
59   An exception of  sorts can be found in Robinson et al., ‘Political Foundations of  the Resource Curse’. 
But their formal model captures little that is directly relevant to understanding how labour markets 
affect politics in the Gulf.
60   Herb, Wages of  Oil, p. 187.
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What is perhaps most striking, however, is that even in the Gulf  monarchies – which are 
otherwise much like each other – we find sharp variations in outcomes, variations that are 
the result of  further conditionalities in the impact of  oil on outcomes. Kuwait has a rela-
tively high level of  political participation while the UAE has achieved a remarkable degree 
of  economic diversification. Why this divergence among two otherwise similar states? The 
answer lies in Kuwait’s elected National Assembly, which has had enough political influence 
to push Kuwait along a very different developmental path from that followed by the UAE 
and, increasingly, Qatar (neither of  which has strong representative institutions). Kuwait cit-
izens rely on oil revenues, via state employment, for the bulk of  their income, and thus they 
have little reason to make the necessary compromises to spur private sector development: 
this sort of  development generates little in the way of  taxes and creates jobs for foreigners, 
not citizens. In the UAE, by contrast, citizens have little voice, so the ruling family and other 
large capitalists set policies that follow their interests: they allow massive immigration of  low-
cost labour and promote policies that increase the value of  their investments, especially in 
real estate. In both cases the structure of  labour markets is important, but the results differ 
sharply between the two cases61 because of  variations in who has control over policy making.
Overall, the Gulf  monarchies offer a story of  causal complexity, one that rivals the sort of 
causal complexity found by Ross in his case studies of  civil wars. Yet much of  the existing 
literature misses the causal mechanisms that drive outcomes in these states. One explanation 
for this is simply that the lessons of  the Gulf  monarchies do not easily generalise to a wider 
array of  countries, so the causal mechanisms are thought to be idiosyncratic. The desire for 
law-like statements that apply across many countries, in this example at least, is an obstacle 
to understanding the resource curse in the cases that receive the highest levels of  rent wealth. 
Latin American Populism
A rich vein of  work on the resource curse has explored the consequences of  rents for democ-
ratisation and state capacity in Latin America, and especially Venezuela. Natural resource 
exporters in Latin America, more so than in the Middle East, have experienced episodes of 
democracy as well as episodes of  authoritarianism, and often the two alternate in countries 
that are dependent on natural resource rents.
In her 1986 work on Venezuela, Karl argued that ‘oil revenues paid the bill for Vene-
zuela’s pacted democracy’.62 Citing Barrington Moore, she notes that the prospects for 
democracy are affected by how the landed upper-class in agrarian societies adapts to 
modernisation. In Venezuela, oil undermined agriculture; traditional agricultural elites 
became urban elites, losing their rural political power. At the same time, oil fostered the 
growth of  a middle class, but less so a working class. The end result – which depended on 
other factors as well, and my presentation here does not capture the full richness of  the 
argument – was that Venezuela was able to forge a pacted democracy.63 
61   For a full exposition of  the argument see Herb, Wages of  Oil.
62   Karl, ‘Petroleum and Political Pacts’, p. 215.
63   Ibid., pp. 200–1.
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Dunning, in his 2008 Crude Democracy, also argues, on the basis of  the Venezuelan case, that 
under some conditions rents can make democracy more likely. The causal mechanism that 
he identifies occurs when oil revenues are distributed to address the consumption demands 
of  the lower classes. The possibility of  distributing oil revenues, rather than redistributing 
private wealth held by the upper classes, alleviates elite fears that democracy will impov-
erish them. Thus the upper classes more willingly surrender political power to the lower 
classes under democracy.64 Dunning shows how this works in case studies of  three addi-
tional Latin American cases (Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile) and one African case, Botswana.
A more recent literature has sought to explain the pattern of  the rise of  radical left-wing 
Latin American populism. This literature is less sanguine about the impact of  rent wealth 
on democracy.65 In one of  the more prominent pieces in this genre, Kurt Weyland argues 
that rents have allowed some Latin American countries to proclaim ‘a frontal attack on 
neoliberalism’. Countries with less rent wealth, by contrast, have had to pursue ‘socioeco-
nomic improvements inside the confines of  the market system’.66 The populist cases are 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia; Brazil, Uruguay and Chile are more moderate, while 
Argentina is ‘oscillating in between’.67 The outcome that is explained here is the degree of 
left-wing tilt in the political system, which is not the same as democracy and authoritari-
anism; nonetheless, it is clear that the moderate leftists are better for democracy overall.
These explorations of  the political consequences of  oil in Latin America by Karl, Dunning 
and Weyland (and others) provide a vivid illustration of  the advantages of  detailed case 
studies. Dunning’s argument, for example, is more convincing the closer it is to the cases 
that inspired it in the first place, notably Venezuela. Oil has, at times, helped to support 
Venezuelan democracy, but only in ways that are specific to the sort of  political context 
found in South America. Dunning examines several other South American cases, and 
shows evidence of  similar causal mechanisms. The case study of  Botswana is thought-pro-
voking and useful, but less convincing. Weyland’s argument about the negative effects of 
rent income in more recent years, as rents provide space for a turn to the hard left, relies 
on a context in which there is political tension between the hard left and a more moderate 
neo-liberal left. The argument does not travel well to Iran or Algeria, though at the same 
time, by giving a detailed examination of  how rents affect politics in one region of  the 
world, it provides us with evocative questions that help illustrate politics in rentiers else-
where, even if  the specific causal mechanisms are different. And, even if  it does not travel 
well, it tells us something interesting and useful about politics in some Latin American 
countries, which ought to be enough.
64   Dunning, Crude Democracy, pp. 9–11.
65   Hector E. Schamis, ‘Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions’, Journal of  Democracy 17/4 
(2006), pp. 20–34.
66   Kurt Weyland, ‘The Rise of  Latin America’s Two Lefts: Insights from Rentier State Theory’, 
Comparative Politics 41/2 (2009), pp. 145–64 at p. 146.
67   Ibid., p. 145.
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The Ontology of the Resource Curse
A final example of  the importance of  case studies in exploring causal mechanisms lies in the 
fascinating question – raised by Steffen Hertog – of  the comparison between the Gulf  rent-
iers and those of  West Africa, especially Equatorial Guinea, where per capita rent income 
approaches that of  the Gulf  states. The rulers of  the Gulf  states have spent generously on 
the provision of  social services to their populations, even while distributing rents to family 
members. In Equatorial Guinea, the ruling family has largely neglected its population, and 
its human development achievements do not reflect its rent wealth at all. This is surpris-
ing, and not at all the expected result for those familiar with the Arab states of  the Gulf. 
The causal mechanisms identified in the resource curse literature do not give us much trac-
tion in understanding this problem, and the very small number of  cases poses problems for 
large-n analysis. We are unlikely to understand the diverging performance of  Equatorial 
Guinea and the Gulf  states without close and detailed case studies of  both regions.
When scholars look at individual cases of  rentierism, they often find causal mechanisms 
through which rents have affected political outcomes. These causal mechanisms, however, 
often do not travel easily to other regions of  the world, to neighbouring countries, or even 
within one country across time (thus the variation in the effect of  rents on democracy over 
time in Venezuela). This does not mean that rents do not have a political impact: the evi-
dence is overwhelming that they do. What it suggests, however, is that there is a high level 
of  causal complexity in the pathways through which rents affect political and economic 
outcomes. There are many causal mechanisms at work, and most of  them are specific to a 
subset of  all cases – which is to say, they are conditional. The impact of  rents, moreover, can 
be very different in countries that have very high levels of  rents (Qatar) and those with lower 
levels (Angola and Australia). The ontology of  the resource curse is a complicated thing.
It is not particularly surprising, on some reflection, that we find so much casual complexity 
in the resource curse. The literature, it is worth remembering, is about an independent 
variable. Comparative politics literatures that focus not on independent variables but 
instead on outcomes (say, democracy) often feature a good deal of  equifinality, in the 
sense that there are sets of  causal factors (or paths) that result in democracy. Yet countries 
that arrive at democracy generally share some attributes. By contrast, an influx of  rent 
income is something that can affect countries across a very wide range of  circumstances: 
it requires no particular level of  economic development,68 the adoption of  no particular 
political, social and economic institutions, and no sort of  common history. The windfall 
comes from abroad, more or less by geological chance. It stands to reason that the con-
sequences of  this income will be decisively shaped by the political, economic and social 
contexts in place when the windfall arrives, and that there will be a great deal of  variety 
in the nature of  these contexts.
68   Lower levels of  per capita rent income are noticeable only in poor countries, but this makes it more, 
rather than less, difficult to trace out the negative impacts of  rents, since rents have an important role 
only because the country is poor in the first place.
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Methodology and the Resource Curse
John Gerring, in an article in which he questions the vogue for causal mechanisms, argues 
that ‘the covariational relationship is usually the key component of  concern for policy 
makers’.69 Even if  we do not know the causal mechanisms, he argues, the net effect of 
rents on outcomes is what really matters. Gerring cites the literature on the resource curse 
and democracy as an example.70 To illustrate the point further, he draws on a medical 
example, that of  penicillin: the covariational relationship between taking penicillin and no 
longer being ill is so strong that we can rely on the covariation without a clear grasp of  the 
causal mechanism.71 The resource curse, however, is not like this, in two crucial respects. 
In the case of  penicillin we can reasonably assume that the causal relationships have the 
same sign, operate similarly on most people, show some relationship to the dose, and so 
forth. None of  these appear to be the case with the resource curse. Instead, we have a wide 
variety of  causal mechanisms that interact with other variables and have effects that are 
not all in one direction.72 A second difference is also crucial. There are under 200 sover-
eign states in the world, and only some of  these receive significant sums of  rent income. 
If  we had many more cases, we could accommodate causal complexity, if  only by restrict-
ing our datasets to cases in which we have reason to think that a manageable number of 
causal pathways are at work. In a world with a few thousand countries that receive oil 
rents on the level of  Kuwait, large-n methods might give us more reliable results – or at 
least would be an improvement on the three or four cases we have now. 
Given causal complexity and a limited number of  cases, the overall covariational relation-
ship is of  interest, but limited interest. Even if  we could discern some sort of  average of 
individual causal effects, these effects have such varying impacts across cases that to say 
anything – or make any coherent policy intervention or recommendation – we need to 
have a much more detailed understanding of  the way that causal mechanisms operate in 
specific cases.73
69   Gerring, ‘Causal Mechanisms: Yes, But … ’, p. 1506.
70   Ibid., p. 1507.
71   Ibid., p. 1505.
72   For a defence of  the use of  large-n methods in the face of  causal complexity, see Humphreys, ‘Natural 
Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution’.
73   This is an observation that has been made previously. Shelton, for example, writes that ‘exploring the 
conditions under which natural resources lead to good or bad performance is probably more important 
than proving the central tendency to be positive’. Cameron A. Shelton, ‘Comments [on Lederman and 
Maloney]’, Economía 9/1 (1 October 2008), pp. 44–57 at p. 46.
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To be clear, my argument here is not against large-n analysis generally in political science. 
In many contexts, large-n regressions are a fine tool, especially when the unit of  anal-
ysis is not the sovereign state. Even in the case of  the resource curse, it was not at all 
wrongheaded to use multivariate techniques to explore the relationships in the data. 
The landmark studies by Sachs and Warner, Ross, and Collier and Hoeffler are useful and 
necessary: they apply a common method to an important problem. But it is also necessary 
to learn from the results, and I think the findings of  the larger econometric literature on 
the resource curse suggest that the method is not well suited to the problem. 
Because political scientists are deeply invested in the search for covering-law-type regu-
larities across multiple cases, we privilege research that looks for these laws and claims to 
find them, even when the evidence of  the actual political world suggests to us that these 
laws in fact are not there. Political scientists would prefer that rents affect political and eco-
nomic outcomes in ways that are generalisable across space, time and context. The world, 
however, does not care what political scientists like. The world determines the ontology 
of  the resource curse. If  political scientists want to understand these causal mechanisms, 
we need to adopt methods that fit that ontology. If  the causal mechanisms are not in fact 
operating across a large number of  cases, then prioritising generalisability in our theories 
and methods distorts our understanding of  the resource curse, rather than advancing it.
We can see the constraints of  large-n methods, and their focus on the overall covariational 
relationship, quite vividly in the degree to which resource curse ‘pessimists’ embrace the 
policy implications of  their findings. As Waldner and Smith observe, resource curse pessi-
mists rarely take completely seriously the implications of  their studies, which is that the oil 
should be left in the ground.74 In almost all cases, indeed, conditionality is embraced and 
it is argued that states should do what it takes to avoid the curse – although, if  the negative 
consequences of  rents are as widespread as some argue, the sensible solution is to leave the 
oil in the ground rather than chance the harmful consequences.
By contrast, the case study literature has generated knowledge that is more useful in policy 
making, and more generally in understanding how rents affect outcomes in any particu-
lar country. Dunning’s observation that rents can relieve distributional conflicts does not 
explain all, or even most, rentiers, but it does help a great deal in understanding the effect 
of  rents in Latin American cases. The causal mechanism in Ross’s work on civil wars 
that is most widely generalisable is that insurgent groups with access to natural resource 
wealth will stay in the field longer. As Fearon points out, ‘no fancy cross-national research 
is needed to support or make such an argument plausible’.75 But Ross’s point about ‘booty 
futures’, while applying to many fewer cases, is nonetheless much more fertile from a 
policy point of  view. Preventing even one international oil company from triggering a civil 
war – as Ross says happened in the Congo Republic – would be a real triumph, even if  the 
74   Waldner and Smith, ‘Rentier States and State Transformations’, p. 723.
75   James D. Fearon, ‘Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War’, Journal of  Conflict Resolution 49/4 
(1 August 2005), pp. 483–507 at p. 504.
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causal mechanism is relatively rare, or not statistically significant in a large-n regression.76 
In this case, the ubiquity – or generalisability – of  the causal mechanism, which would 
make it a ‘finding’ of  a regression model, really is not the point. 
A high degree of  causal complexity does not prevent the accumulation of  knowledge 
in the study of  the resource curse. The path to this accumulation in case studies of  the 
resource curse lies in developing well-specified causal mechanisms at work in specific 
cases, then looking at other cases to see if  those causal mechanisms are present. Thus, 
for example, oil distorts labour markets in the rich Gulf  rentiers. Does it have a similar 
effect in Trinidad, Brunei or Norway? If  not, why? Using a different example, is the sale 
of  booty futures a possibility in the Syrian civil war? How do some rentiers develop strong 
state-owned enterprises, while others do not? Does Latin American populism have cog-
nates elsewhere? Why have rich Gulf  rentiers provided extensive social services to their 
citizens while richer African rentiers have not?
This strategy gives us much more material to work with when trying to understand the 
workings of  the resource curse in new rentiers, such as Equatorial Guinea. We might think 
of  the literature as providing an inventory of  causal mechanisms to look for across other 
cases. We would not expect causal mechanisms found in one set of  cases to be found in all 
rentiers, but they will probably illuminate aspects of  other cases. And even if  they do not 
operate in the same manner, case study knowledge helps us to understand what to look 
for in rentiers, and gives us some sense of  the universe of  possibilities. This achieves an 
accumulation of  real knowledge about the effect of  rents on political outcomes while also 
reflecting the actual ontology of  the causal mechanisms of  rentierism.
76   Ross, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?’, p. 58.
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